That’s exactly the reason why we designed the tokenomics for DIVA Protocol in a highly flexible way from the beginning. Have a read. Would be curious to hear your thoughts: https://www.divaprotocol.io/posts/diva-tokenomics
I agree re: decentralisation bootstrapping over time being advantageous, and like low fees emission with a hard cap.
The decentralised protocol takeover mechanism introduces interesting and beneficial incentives, I think. I applaud the direction.
I have three comments on how you might achieve greater decentralisation:
1. The static delegation mechanism will result in delegation inertia, favouring the incumbent protocol manager and making them harder to unseat. Dynamic (expiring) delegation would require a degree of active participation.
2. I think it would produce better decentralisation if a contender who achieves higher than 20-25% of the vote started receiving their proportion of the overall fees. More dynamic scrum of governance, produces better incentives for working decentralisation IMO.
3. I think the fees for a centralised manager could reduce incrementally each year, being redirected over time to a more distributed treasury mechanism that is subject to governance management, so incentivises community governance instead of a centralised governor.
I think that it’s an eminently reasonable move, but there aren’t merely two choices; sushi could also reduce public yield and redirect a portion (Eg 50%) to runway.
True, even leaving maybe 5-10% on the table for investors could be a good signalling mechanism to investors that fees intend to accrue back to holders.
That’s exactly the reason why we designed the tokenomics for DIVA Protocol in a highly flexible way from the beginning. Have a read. Would be curious to hear your thoughts: https://www.divaprotocol.io/posts/diva-tokenomics
I agree re: decentralisation bootstrapping over time being advantageous, and like low fees emission with a hard cap.
The decentralised protocol takeover mechanism introduces interesting and beneficial incentives, I think. I applaud the direction.
I have three comments on how you might achieve greater decentralisation:
1. The static delegation mechanism will result in delegation inertia, favouring the incumbent protocol manager and making them harder to unseat. Dynamic (expiring) delegation would require a degree of active participation.
2. I think it would produce better decentralisation if a contender who achieves higher than 20-25% of the vote started receiving their proportion of the overall fees. More dynamic scrum of governance, produces better incentives for working decentralisation IMO.
3. I think the fees for a centralised manager could reduce incrementally each year, being redirected over time to a more distributed treasury mechanism that is subject to governance management, so incentivises community governance instead of a centralised governor.
I think that it’s an eminently reasonable move, but there aren’t merely two choices; sushi could also reduce public yield and redirect a portion (Eg 50%) to runway.
True, even leaving maybe 5-10% on the table for investors could be a good signalling mechanism to investors that fees intend to accrue back to holders.